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THE CONTROLLED GROUP RULE FOR PURPOSES
OF THE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY PROVISIONS





Employers that withdraw from multiemployer pension plans incur
withdrawal liability pursuant to Title IV of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), as amended.' For purposes
of Title IV, all trades or businesses under common control are con-
sidered a single employer.2 This article discusses the general effects of
the "controlled group" rule and the effect of the rule on certain
specialized procedural issues.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Employer Liability for Guaranteed Benefits
ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to protect employees'
rights to their retirement benefits. To ensure that promised benefits
will be paid, Congress established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration ("PBGC"). PBGC, a government agency funded by insur-
* Israel Goldowitz received his B.A. from Boston University in 1975 and his J.D. from George
Washington University in 1979. Since 1979, he has been a staff attorney with the UMWA Health and
Retirement Funds. Between 1984 and 1986, he was in charge of the Funds' withdrawal liability litigation
program. He has been Deputy General Counsel since December, 1986.
** Thomas S. Gigot received his B.S. from Marquette University in 1980 and his J.D. from
Georgetown University in 1984. He has been a staff attorney with the UMWA Health and Retirement
Funds since 1984, and is currently in charge of the Funds' withdrawal liability litigation program. The
views set forth here are solely those of the authors.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (1982).
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ance premiums, pays guaranteed benefits in the event a defined benefit
pension plan is terminated with insufficient assets.3
Under Section 4062(b) of ERISA, where PBGC pays benefits under
a terminated plan, the "employer" is liable over to PBGC for any
asset deficiency, not to exceed 75% of the employer's net worth.4 In
this regard, Section 4001(b)(1) of ERISA provides in relevant part that
"all employees of trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated)
which are under common control shall be treated as employed by a
single employer and all such trades or businesses as a single em-
ployer." 5 Section 4001(b)(1) authorizes PBGC to prescribe regulations
to define these terms in a manner "consistent and coextensive" with
Treasury regulations prescribed for similar purposes under Section
414(c) of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). 6
The PBGC's regulations provide that "trades or businesses ...
under common control" shall have the "same meaning" as in Code
§ 414(c) and the regulations issued thereunder. 7 The Treasury regu-




As more fully discussed in part IV-C of this Article, a parent-sub-
sidiary controlled group exists where one business owns at least 80%
of one or more other businesses, and a brother-sister controlled group
may exist where the same five or fewer individuals own at least 80%
of two or more businesses. 9 A combined controlled group is a com-
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1381 (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1982).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).
6. Id. Section 414(c) of the Code provides that all commonly controlled trades or businesses shall
be considered a single employer for purposes of the anti-discrimination requirements for tax-qualified
plans. It is designed to prevent employers from avoiding those requirements by operating through separate
corporations. H. R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADmIN.
NEws 4670, 4716.
7. 29 C.F.R. § 2612.2 (1986).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2 (1988).
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(c).
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bination of a parent-subsidiary controlled group and a brother-sister
controlled group.'0
The leading case applying the controlled group rule under ERISA
is PBGC v. Ouimet Co." Ouimet involved a single-employer plan
maintained by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Ouimet Corpora-
tion.12 The plan was terminated with insufficient assets to pay benefits,
and because the subsidiary was in bankruptcy, PBGC sought to re-
cover the shortfall from the Ouimet Corporation and several other
affiliates, asserting that they were members of a combined brother-
sister/parent-subsidiary controlled group.13 The court agreed that these
businesses constituted a controlled group and thus a single "em-
ployer," as meant by Section 4001(b)(1) of ERISA.14 The court further
held that this definition of "employer" applied under Section 4062(b)
of ERISA and that all members of the Ouimet controlled group were
therefore jointly and severally liable to PBGC.' 5
B. Employer Liability for Withdrawal
Initially, only single-employer plans were covered by the PBGC's
mandatory guaranty program. The effective date of mandatory cov-
erage for multiemployer plans was deferred pending study, although
PBGC could pay benefits under a terminated multiemployer plan in
its discretion. In the event of termination of a covered multiemployer
plan with insufficient assets, the only employers who would be liable
to PBGC were those who had remained in the plan until it terminated
and those who had withdrawn within the preceding five years.16 Con-
gress became concerned that, if this remained the law, it would create
an incentive to withdraw early when the guarantees became mandatory,
for multiemployer plans, and would thereby shift an ever-increasing
10. Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2(a) (1987). See infra section IV(C) for a detailed discussion of the
regulations.
11. PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 470 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mass. 1979), affd, 630 F.2d 4 (Ist Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 (1981) [Ouimet I].
12. Ouimet , 470 F. Supp. at 948.
13. Id. at 947-48.
14. Id. at 948-49.
15. Id. at 945.
16. See PBGC v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); Connolly v. PBGC, 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
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share of the plan's funding burden to remaining employers.1 7 There-
fore, in 1980, Congress enacted the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act ("MPPAA"),8 which established an immediate and
non-contingent liability to a multiemployer plan in the event of em-
ployer withdrawal.
Section 4201(a) of ERISA, as amended,' 9 provides that an "em-
ployer" that withdraws from a multiemployer plan is liable to the
plan for its share of any unfunded vested benefits. The term "em-
ployer" pervades the withdrawal liability provisions of ERISA. Though
Title IV of ERISA contains no general definition of "employer," in
enacting MPPAA Congress reaffirned the validity of the Ouimet de-
cision:
[I]f a terminating single employer plan is maintained by one or more members of
a controlled group, the entire group is the "employer" and is responsible for any
employer liability. The leading case in this area is [PBGC] v. Ouimet Corp. [citation
omitted], in which the court correctly held that all members of a controlled group
are jointly and severally liable for employer liability imposed under section 4062 of
ERISA. The bill does not modify the definition of "employer" in any way, and
the Ouimet decision remains good law?'
Accordingly, the courts have uniformly applied the controlled group
rule in withdrawal liability cases. 21 Because the controlled group rule
is central to the withdrawal liability provisions of ERISA, an under-
standing of the rule and its effects is important whenever a business
that participates in a multiemployer plan, such as the United Mine
Workers of America 1950 or 1974 Pension Plan, has affiliates that
may be under common control. This is so even though those affiliates
may be non-union or even in a different industry.Y
III. GENERAL SummARY OF WiTrnnAwAL LI~ABLITY PROVISIONS
AND EFFECTS OF THE CONTROLLED GRouP RULE
An employer incurs a complete withdrawal from a multiemployer
pension plan when it permanently ceases all covered operations or
17. R. A. Gray, 467 U.S. at 717; Connolly, 475 U.S. at 211.
18. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1206-
1311.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a).
20. 126 CONG. Rac. 23287 (1980) (joint statement of Senators Javits and Williams) (emphasis added).
21. See infra section IV.
22. See Connors v. Peles Coal Co., 637 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1986) (non-union coal proprietorship
liable for controlled group member's withdrawal from UMWA 1950 and 1974 Pension Plans); Connors
v. Calvert Dev. Co., 622 F. Supp. 877 (D.D.C. 1985) (same: non-coal partnership).
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ceases to have an obligation to contribute.? Upon withdrawal, an
employer is liable for its allocable share of the plan's unfunded vested
benefits. 24 With one exception, the alternative allocation methods au-
thorized by ERISA take into account the employer's required con-
tributions for a particular base period in determining its allocable share
of unfunded vested benefits.?
When a plan determines that an employer has withdrawn and com-
putes the amount of its liability, it notifies the employer and demands
payment. 26 This "notice and demand" triggers a requirement that the
employer begin paying its withdrawal liability in installments within
60 days. It also triggers a 90-day deadline for the employer to request
plan sponsor review.27 Thereafter, the employer must initiate arbitra-
tion within a maximum of 180 days from the date of its request for
review.? If no arbitration is initiated, the employer's withdrawal li-
ability is "due and owing" according to the schedule set forth in the
notice and demand. 29 In that event, if the employer is in default of
its scheduled payments, the plan may accelerate the principal amount
of the employer's withdrawal liability upon 60 days' notice and sue
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a). Though there has been considerable litigation concerning the meaning of
"permanent," e.g., Western Dominion Coal Co. v. UMWA 1950 and 1974 Pension Plans, 6 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2353 (1985) (collecting cases), it is clear that once a cessation matures into permanency
the date of withdrawal relates back to the date the cessation began. E.g., Loomis Armored, Inc. v. Central
States Pension Fund, 8 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1899, 1907-10 (1987). "Partial" withdrawals, 29
U.S.C. § 1385, are also affected by the controlled group rule. See Robbins v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling
Co., 636 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381(b), 1391.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1391(b),(c),(2)-(4). The UMWA 1950 and 1974 Plans use the so-called "rolling-
five" method, under which the base period is the five plan years preceding withdrawal. 29 U.S.C. §
1391(c)(3). Congress decided to impose very strict rules for withdrawal liability from the UMWA Plans,
due to their historic financial difficulties. See Calvert & Youngblood Coal Co. v. UMWA 1950 Pension
Trust, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1106, 1110-11 (1985); Combs v. Miller, No. 84-842 (D.D.C. Sept.
28, 1984). In addition to mandating the rolling-five method absent a plan amendment, Congress specified
that certain relief provisions would not apply absent a plan amendment. 29 U.S.C. § 1391(d). The Plans'
settlors, the United Mine workers of America and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association, Inc.,
have exclusive authority to amend the Plans in most circumstances. See UMWA Health and Retirement
Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982). They have adopted only the "sale of assets" rule of Section
4204 of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1384.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1382, 1399(b)(1).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)(A),(c)(2).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1). If the plan sponsor issues its decision on review in less than 120 days,
the employer has only 60 additional days within which to initiate arbitration. Id. See Babler v. Roy L.
Houck Construction Co., 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1997 (1985).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1). The courts have construed this to mean that the employer has forfeited
its defenses. E.g., I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Clinton Engines Corp., 825 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1987).5
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for that amount, plus interest, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees.30
Although Congress' endorsement of Ouimet makes it clear that
the controlled group rule renders all commonly-controlled businesses
jointly and severally liable for withdrawal, the rule is more than a
collection device. Because it defines "employer," it applies to all of
the withdrawal liability provisions of ERISA that refer to the "em-
ployer. "31
Thus, there is no withdrawal unless all controlled group members
have permanently ceased all covered operations or ceased to have an
obligation to contribute. 2 In the event of withdrawal, all controlled
group members' required contributions within the applicable base pe-
riod are aggregated for purpose of calculating withdrawal liability.33
In addition, a notice and demand to one controlled group member
will be deemed notice to all.4 Separate demands inadvertently issued
to two members of a controlled group may be consolidated, as may
separate arbitration proceedings initiated by the two members. 35
IV. DEFiNITION OF CONTROLLED GRouF
A. Trade or Business
A threshold question under Section 4001(b)(1) of ERISA is the
meaning of "trade or business." The leading case is PBGC v. Center
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1399(c)(5)(A), 1451(b) (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g)(2), 1145
(1982)). See Combs v. Western Coal Corp., 611 F. Supp. 917, 922-23 (D.D.C. 1985). The plan is also
entitled to enforce the employer's obligation to make installment payments pending arbitration. E.g., Lads
Trucking v. Board of Trustees, 777 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1986); Connors v. Brady-Cline Coal Co., 668
F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1987). Of course, if the arbitrator holds in the employer's favor, the employer is
entitled to a refund of its interim payments, with interest. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(d); 29 C.F.R. § 2644.3 (1987).
Though the arbitrator has authority to award fees and costs to the prevailing party, this is rarely done.
31. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. at 654-60; Dorn's Transp., Inc. v. Teamsters
Pension Trust Fund, 596 F. Supp. 350, 355 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 787 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1986).
32. Peles Coal Co., 637 F. Supp. 321; UMWA 1974 Pension Plan v. Williamson Shaft Contracting
Co., 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1593 (1984); Dyck v. Southern Pacific Milling Co., 4 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1346 (1983).
33. Manor Mines, Inc. v. UMWA 1950 and 1974 Pension Plans, 5 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
1709 (1984).
34. E.g., IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 126-30 (3d
Cir. 1986); Calvert Dev. Co., 622 F. Supp. 877. See infra section V(B) for a detailed discussion on this
point.
35. Manor Mines, 5 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1711-13.
[Vol. 90
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City Motors, Inc.36 Center City, an automobile dealership, had main-
tained a single-employer plan.3 7 Upon termination, PBGC sued not
only Center City but its sole shareholders, who personally owned the
land and building where the dealership was located.18 The shareholders
leased the property to the corporation under a "net lease," where the
lessee is obligated to pay all expenses. 39 Therefore, the shareholders
contended that they took no part in management of the property 0
Accordingly, they argued, they were not in the real estate "trade or
business," but were essentially passive investors receiving rental in-
come.
41
The court disagreed. Although it acknowledged that property rented
under a net lease is not a "trade or business" for tax purposes, 42 the
court declined to follow that definition for employer liability purposes.
The purpose of the tax rule, the court noted, is to prevent taxpayers
from converting capital losses on investment property into ordinary
losses. 43 The purpose of ERISA, however, is to maximize protection
of employees. To this end, the court held, the controlled group rule
should be liberally construed to prevent the owners of a business from
limiting their pension obligations by "fractionalization" of that busi-
ness.44
The question of what constitutes a "trade or business" may also
arise in the case of informal or short-term ventures carried out for
profit. For example, if an individual received income from intermittent
free-lance carpentry work during a period when he owned all the stock
of a mining corporation, he might contend that the carpentry work
did not rise to a trade or business, because he did not hold himself
out as the proprietor of a carpentry business. Though tax treatment
36. PBGC v. Center City Motors, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 409 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
37. Id. at 410.
38. Id. at 412.
39. Id. at 411.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 412-13. The IRS' position on this has not always been consistent. See Jackson, IRS
Modifies its Position on a Unit of Rental Property as a Trade or Business, 62 J. op TAX'N 284 (1985).
43. Id. at 411.
44. Center City, 609 F. Supp. at 412. Accord United Food & Commercial Workers v. Progressive
Supermarkets, 644 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1986).
7
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would not be dispositive under the Center City case, if this individual
had claimed "profit or loss from a business or profession" on Sched-
ule C to his federal tax return, this admission would probably be
sufficient at least to raise a triable issue.45 Certainly, it would be rea-
sonable for the individual to be required to show why he should not
be bound by his representations to the Internal Revenue Service.
B. Necessity of Employees
It could be argued that an entity without any employees cannot
be part of a controlled group because it is not a common-law em-
ployer. In Ouimet, one of the commonly controlled entities, the War-
eham Trust, was a holding company organized as a Massachusetts
business trust.46 The defendants argued that the Trust was not a con-
trolled group member because it had no employees, which they con-
tended was a predicate to a finding that it was part of an "employer"
under ERISA § 4001(c)(1).47 ("All employees of trades or businesses
under common control ... shall be treated as employed by a single
employer, and all such trades or businesses as a single employer.")
The court rejected that argument, relying on the first sentence of that
Section, which specifies that "an individual who owns the entire in-
terest in an unincorporated business is treated as his own employee. ' 48
In the case of a corporation, the analysis is different, but the result
is the same. The antecedent of "all such" trades or businesses in
Section 4001(b)(1) is "trades or businesses under common control,"
even though that phrase appears within the separate rule that "all
employees of trades or businesses under common control ... shall
be treated as employed by a single employer." Therefore, even if such
a trade or business has no employees, it is a controlled group member.4 9
45. See Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980) (taxpayer's "systematic and continuous"
activities placed him in the trade or business of real estate rental).
46. Ouimet I, 470 F. Supp. at 949.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 951 n.16. Cf. Spring Branch Mining Co. v. UMWA 1950 Pension Trust, No. 2:86-
0149, slip op. at 8-13 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 30, 1987) (Congress intended contributor to UMWA 1950 Pension
Plan to be considered an "employer," even if it never had employees who vested in a benefit under that
plan); accord Warrior Coal Co. v. Connors, 649 F. Supp. 1090 (W.D.Va. 1986).
[Vol. 90
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If it were otherwise, employers would be able to avoid their statutory
liabilities by "fractionalization" of their business enterprise and at-
tendant dispersion of assets.
C. Ownership
1. In General
As noted in Part II-A, above, the pertinent Treasury regulations
set a general 80% common ownership threshold, referred to as a
"controlling interest," for each of the three types of controlled groups.50
The regulations also set a separate 50% identical ownership test, re-
ferred to as "effective control," for brother-sister controlled groups.5 1
The best way to explain the controlling interest and effective control
requirements is by example.
Suppose three unrelated persons, Smith, Jones, and Doe, own the
following percentages of corporations X and y.52
Corporations Identical
Persons X Y Ownership Percentage
Smith 30% 20% 20%
Jones 400o 10% 10%
Doe 30% 60% 30%
100% 900 60%
(Table 1)
Corporations X and Y are members of a brother-sister controlled
group because the same five or fewer persons (Smith, Jones, and Doe)
50. Treas. Reg. § l1.414(c)-2(b)(2) (1987).
51. See Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2(c) (1987). See generally United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455
U.S. 16 (1982) (Regulation's 50% identical ownership test ensures that the brother-sister organizations are
in fact controlled by the group of stockholders as one economic enterprise).
52. "Persons" may be individuals, estates or trusts, but not corporations. See Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-
2(c). Ownership with respect to a corporation is measured as the total voting power or total value of all
classes of stock. See Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)- 2(b)(2)(A) (1987). 9
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together own at least 80% of each corporation (100% of X and 90%
of Y), and the sum of their identical ownerships in X and Y (rep-
resented by the fourth column of the table) exceeds 50%.
In Table 2 below, however, corporations W and Z are not in a
brother-sister group because the effective control test is not satisfied,
even though the 80% "controlling interest" test is satisfied.
Corporations Identical
Persons W Z Ownership Percentage
Smith 700/o 10%70 10%7o
Jones 57o 85%/o 507o
Doe 25076 5%/o 5%
10007 100070 20%7o
(Table 2)
Suppose that it can be proven, however, that Jones so dominated
the management and operations of corporation W that Smith and
Doe, although retaining their respective 7007o and 25% ownership in-
terests, had no say in W's management. That fact should not alter
the conclusion that W and Z are not under common control. In the
Western Dominion case,5 3 the arbitrator held that the controlled group
tests are "bright line" tests and, therefore, that even 7507o common
ownership fails the controlling interest test5 4 We believe this is a sound
result. Employers should be entitled to make business decisions sur-
rounding withdrawal liability in reliance on the controlled group re-
gulations. A pension plan should also be entitled to make withdrawal
liability decisions based on a consistent and objective measure. 5 The
"bright line" approach results in necessary predictability in the law.
53. Western Dominion, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2353. But see Central Transport, Inc. v.
Central States Pension Fund, 640 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd mem., 816 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3320 (Nov. 3, 1987) (purchaser in stock transaction, which is subject
to ICC approval, does not have ownership, constructive or otherwise, of that stock for controlled group
purposes).
54. Western Dominion, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2369.
55. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1394 (plan rules must apply consistently).
[Vol. 90
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As a final example of the controlling interest and effective control
tests, suppose Smith, Jones, and Doe own the following percentages
of corporations U and V.
Corporations Identical
Persons U V Ownership Percentage
Smith 33-1/3% 50% 33-1/3%
Jones 33-1/3% 0% 0%
Doe 33-1/3% 50% 33-1/3%
100% 100% 66-2/3%
(Table 3)
Both tests of the brother-sister definition appear to be met, but
a third element, not found in the regulations, is lacking.
In the Vogel case,5 6 the Supreme Court concluded that Section 1563
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, from which Treas. Reg. §
11.414(c) was indirectly derived,5 7 requires that each of the "five or
fewer persons" own at least some percentage of each of the subject
organizations.5 8 In Table 3, Jones owns no interest in V, and excluding
Jones from the set of five or fewer persons means that the 80%
controlling interest test cannot be satisfied.: 9 Smith and Doe together
own only 66-2/3% of U.
The Vogel requirement ensures that members of a controlled group
will know of the existence of all other controlled group members.
Under Vogel, the persons owning the controlling interest in a business
are necessarily the same persons owning the controlling interest in all
other members of the controlled group.60 Therefore, the consequences
56. Vogel, 455 U.S. at 16.
57. See, eg., Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d at 126.
58. Vogel, 455 U.S. at 19.
59. Courts and arbitrators have applied Vogel in withdrawal liability matters. See, e.g., Barker &
Williamson, 788 F.2d at 123.
60. Vogel, 455 U.S. at 34. "Under this construction of the statute, controlled group membership
cannot catch such a shareholder by surprise." Id.
11
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of common control, such as the "notice to one is notice to all" rule
described in part V-B, infra, are fair because each of the owners will
be in a position to know the affairs of each business.
The controlled group regulations can cast a broad net. As noted
in parts IV-A and -B above, not only a corporation, but a propri-
etorship, partnership, estate or trust, or any other "organization" that
conducts a "trade or business" can be a controlled group member. 6'
The ownership interests in such organizations, moreover, are measured
broadly. With respect to a corporation, ownership can be measured
as a percentage of all voting stock or as a percentage of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock.62 With respect to a partnership,
ownership can be measured as a percentage of the partners' interest
in profits or capital. 3 Similarly, the regulations set forth numerous
rules for attributing the ownership of one person or business to an-
other and for excluding a person's or business' interest from the cal-
culus. 64 For instance, a spouse's or child's interest can be attributed,
respectively, to the other spouse or to the child's parent. 65 In addition,
the ownership interest of an officer, partner, or owner of a "parent"
organization can be excluded in measuring the outstanding ownership
of its subsidiary organization.6 Further, some interests not commonly
perceived as a business "ownership," such as an option to purchase
stock, are treated as ownership interests under the regulations. 67
In sum, because of their intricacies, the controlled group regula-
tions require a cautious reading.
2. Timing
The statute and regulations are silent concerning the effect of
changes in ownership that result in a controlled group coming into
being or ceasing to exist. The courts, however, have uniformly rec-
61. Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2(b)(2).
62. Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2(b)(2)(A).
63. Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-2(b)(2)(C) (1987).
64. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 11.414(c)-3,-4 (1987).
65. Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-4(b)(5),(6) (1987).
66. Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-3(b)(4) (1987).
67. Treas. Reg. § 11.414(c)-4(b) (1987); see Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d at 118.
[Vol. 90
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ognized that for purposes of identifying trades or businesses that have
joint and several liability for withdrawal, common control must be
determined as of the date of withdrawal.6s Section 4203(e) of ERISA69
pinpoints the date of a complete withdrawal as the date covered op-
erations or the obligation to contribute ceased, so it is usually clear
what the relevant date iS.70 If, for example, P corporation, which does
not itself participate in the plan, sells its 80% interest in S corporation
one day after S had permanently ceased its covered operations under
the plan, P remains jointly and severally liable to the plan with respect
to S's withdrawal. 71 Conversely, if P disposed of its 80% interest in
S one day before S permanently ceased covered operations, P would,
at least presumptively, escape liability with respect to S's complete
withdrawal from the plan.72
As noted, this timing rule is not found in the pertinent Treasury
regulations. Indeed, for tax purposes, there is generally a different
timing rule 3 The date-of-withdrawal timing rule is nevertheless in-
tuitively appealing, and courts have embraced it with little or no dis-
cussion.7 4 Moreover, it appears to be consistent with the intent of
Congress, because it parallels the timing rule for single employer plan
terminations, that the "employer," i.e., the controlled group, that
maintained a single employer plan at the time the plan was terminated
is liable to the PBGC.7 5 This timing rule is also supported by the
PBGC reentry regulations under Section 4207(a) of ERISA.7 6 Those
regulations define the employer eligible for reentry relief as the trades
or businesses under common control on the date of the initial with-
drawal .77
68. E.g., Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d 118; Brady-Cline Coal Co., 668 F. Supp. 5; Connors v.
Ryan's Coal Co., No. CV87-H-57-S (N.D. Ala. May 7, 1987); Connors v. Childress Serv. Corp., No.
86-337 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 1987).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1383(e); see generally Loomis Armored, 8 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1901.
70. E.g., Hatfield Enterprises, Inc. v. UMWA 1950 & 1974 Pension Plans, 9 Employee Benefits
Cas. 1980 (1988) (Jaffe, Arb.).
71. Brady-Cline Coal Co., 668 F. Supp. at 5.
72. But see infra part IV(C).
73. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985); Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d at 118.
74. See supra note 55.
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(a) (1982) Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. Opinion Letter 76-115 (Oct.
27, 1976) (available at the West Virginia Law Review Office).
76. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2640, 2647 (1987).
77. Id. at § 2640.6.
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Joint and several liability is, as noted, only one consequence of
being under "common control." The controlled group configuration
will also determine whether and when a withdrawal has occurred and
the amount of required contributions taken into account in the cal-
culation of the withdrawal liability.78 A date-of-withdrawal timing rule
will affect these determinations as well.
Suppose that brother-sister corporations A and B participated in
a multiemployer plan, that A permanently ceased covered operations
in plan year 1982, and that B permanently ceased covered operations
in plan year 1986. Suppose also that A and B ceased to be under
common control in plan year 1984, due to a sale of B's stock to
unrelated persons.
(1)A _ _ _ __ _
(2)




Table 1 suggests three possible answers to the question of when
A withdrew: (1) in 1982, when A ceased covered operations; (2) in
1986, when former sister corporation B ceased covered operations; or
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(3) in 1984, when A and B ceased to be under common control.
Alternative 1 has a logical flaw under the general controlled group
timing rule. Until the 1984 severance of the controlled group, A and
B were part of a single employer for purposes of Title IV. Thus, A's
1982 permanent cessation of covered operations probably should not
constitute a complete withdrawal from the plan .79 Alternative number
2 has a similar flaw. By 1986, A was no longer part of the same
"employer" as B. For this reason, even though B clearly withdrew
in 1986 when it permanently ceased covered operations, it would prob-
ably be incorrect to include A's contribution history in calculating B's
withdrawal liability 0 Indeed, doing so could be unfair to B's new
owners, who may have been unaware of A's existence. Alternative 3,
therefore, would probably be the most logical answer. Upon the con-
trolled group's severance, the "employer" of which A was a part
permanently ceased covered operations and thereby incurred a com-
plete withdrawal.
One possible objection to this approach is that the plan loses part
of A's contribution base in its withdrawal liability calculation. Under
the "rolling-5" method,8' A's liability for its 1984 complete withdrawal
is based on A's required contributions during the 1979 through 1983
plan years. During one of those years, 1983, A had no required con-
tributions. That result, however, is typical in the case of withdrawals
by controlled groups. If A and B remained under common control
through the 1986 cessation of B's covered operations, for example,
then the 1980 part of A's base period would similarly be lost. To the
knowledge of the authors, no arbitrator or court has yet addressed
this difficult question of controlled group timing.
3. Issues of Fairness and Due Process
Joint and several liability for controlled group members can pro-
duce harsh results. Assume that the sole shareholder of a mining cor-
poration inherits a rental property on the eve of his corporation's
79. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3).
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cessation of covered operations. Assuming the rental property rep-
resents a trade or business, the shareholder could find his personal
assets exposed to the withdrawal liability debt incurred by his cor-
poration. This result would follow even though the shareholder took
the affirmative step of incorporating his mining business to insulate
himself from personal liability, took no affirmative steps to pursue
the trade or business of renting real property, and punctiliously kept
the mining and rental businesses separate.
The plain meaning of ERISA § 4001(b)(1), the uniform recognition
of joint and several liability under that Section by the courts,8 2 and
the clearly-expressed legislative intent underlying § 4001(b)(1)83 give
courts and arbitrators little room to stray from the conclusion that
the shareholder will incur personal liability by virtue of his unincor-
porated rental business. Indeed, most courts have expressly rejected
the notion that joint and several liability extends only to those con-
trolled group members with employees or operations covered under
the plan.84
Not surprisingly, therefore, numerous employers have attacked the
controlled group liability rule on due process or "taking" grounds.
Courts have uniformly recognized, however, that the controlled group
rule and its consequences are rational; therefore, the rule survives a
due process or "taking" attack. 85 Joint and several liability, according
to the courts, is a rational means of overcoming the dispersion of
assets through related businesses. 6 Indeed, as the Supreme Court ob-
82. E.g., Board of Trustees v. H.F. Johnson Inc., 830 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1987); Barker & Wil-
liamson, 788 F.2d 118; Calvert Dev. Co., 622 F. Supp. 877; United Food v. Progressive Supermarkets,
644 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1986).
83. 126 CoNG. REc. S11672 (1980) (Senate Floor Explanation), 126 CONG. REc. H7898 (1980)
(remarks of Rep. Thompson); see generally Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. at 641.
84. See, e.g., H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 1013.
85. E.g., Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. at 641. One early district court decision,
PBGC v. Anthony Co., 537 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. IlM. 1982), 542 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (supplementary
opinion) endorsed a narrow application of controlled group liability in the single employer plan context
to those affiliates which derived some financial benefit from the organization that maintained the plan.
The Anthony analysis, however, has been soundly rejected. PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1089
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983) [Oulmet II] ("The analysis in Anthony ignored the realities
of business affiliation, such as that a parent does not have to actually receive dividend payments to benefit
from its subsidiary's successful operations"); accord Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. at 641
(Anthony rejected in withdrawal liability context).
86. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. at 660-66; H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 1013.
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served in Vogel, Congress made a legislative judgment that the com-
mon ownership tests in Code § 1563(a)(2) ensured that the group of
organizations are, in fact, controlled by the same group of stock-
holders as "one economic enterprise."87 Incorporation and its atten-
dant limitation of liability is, of course, a creature of state law, and
Congress' power to "pierce" the corporate veil through the controlled
group device cannot be questioned.88
Indeed, the "unfairness" of controlled group liability is often more
apparent than real. The business organization that participates in a
multiemployer plan should be on notice of its potential withdrawal
liability.1 Such potential liability is but one cost of doing business,
and nothing prevents such a participating business from preparing,
through adequate capitalization, for the possibility of incurring with-
drawal liability. Where the participating business is adequately capi-
talized, the plan will not have to look beyond that business for payment.
In this regard, the common law recognizes that a deliberately un-
dercapitalized corporation's veil may be pierced to prevent unfairness
to the corporation's creditors.9 No great leap of logic is required to
analogize the controlled group rule to this common law rule.
D. Foreign Controlled Group Members
Generally, the labor laws do not have extraterritorial effect, absent
clear evidence that Congress so intended. 91 Section 4001(b)(1) of ER-
ISA, the PBGC regulations, and the Treasury regulations they in-
corporate are silent concerning whether a foreign entity can be
considered a controlled group member. There are two arguments,
however, that would support the proposition that Congress intended
the controlled group rule to have such extraterritorial effect.
87. Vogel, 455 U.S. at 30 (emphasis in original).
88. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. at 660-66; H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 1013.
89. Section 4221(e) of ERISA requires a plan to provide an employer with an estimate of its potential
withdrawal liabiflty upon request. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(e).
90. See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLoPEDA OF TBE LAW OF PRIVATE CoIuoRATioNs § 41 (perm.
ed. 1983).
91. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.,
555 F. Supp. 1251, 1257 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
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First, ERISA's controlled group provision, through a series of cross-
references, ultimately incorporates subsection (a) of Section 1563 of
the Code.92 That subsection defines a controlled group of corporations
to include a parent-subsidiary group. Although subsection (b) of Sec-
tion 1563 generally excludes foreign corporations for tax purposes,
Section 4001(b)(1) of ERISA incorporates not the whole of IRC §
1563 but only subsection (a).93 Therefore, it may be argued, Congress
did not intend to incorporate the exclusion for foreign corporations,
and foreign parents, subsidiaries, or sister entities may thus be con-
trolled group members for withdrawal liability purposes. 94
Second, ERISA applies to any plan maintained by an employer
"engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting com-
merce," and "commerce" is defined as commerce "between any state
and any place outside thereof." 95 Apparently, that is shorthand for
a definition contained in an earlier version of the bill that became
ERISA, commerce "among the several States, between any foreign
country and any State, or between any State and any place outside
thereof."96 Thus, it appears that Congress intended for ERISA to have
extraterritorial effect, at least in some instances. In this regard, the
only explicit mention of extraterritorial effect in ERISA is an exception
for plans "maintained outside of the United States primarily for the
benefit of persons substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens." '9 7
Therefore, it may be argued, Congress did not intend to exclude the
converse - plans maintained in the United States by foreign entities
and their United States affiliates for the benefit of United States cit-
izens or residents. 98
92. Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d at 125-26.
93. Id.
94. Cf. Fujinon Optical, Inc., v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 499 (1981) (two U.S. corporations related
only through a common foreign parent are a single employer for purposes of I.R.C. § 414(c), which
incorporates § 1563(a)). We understand that on this basis PBGC has taken the position that foreign
controlled group members are liable for plan termination. See Matter of Ilco Corp., No. 80-022 (PBGC
Appeals Bd. May 5, 1981).
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(11), 1003(a)(1) (1982).
96. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(12), reprinted in I LEo. HIST. oF Ei A 9 (1976) (emphasis
added).
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(4), 1021(b)(7) (1982).
98. Cf. Bryant v. International Schools Serv. Inc., 502 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982) (provision in Civil Rights Act renouncing coverage of "aliens outside
any State" implies that other extraterritorial effects were intended).
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V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Plan's Right to Information
As noted, to determine the fact and date of withdrawal and the
amount of liability therefor, a plan must determine the identities of
all controlled group members with covered operations and an obli-
gation to contribute.9 Because an employer's statutory obligation to
make agreed-upon contributions, 100 is not subject to the controlled
group rule, 10' a plan will not ordinarily have reliable information con-
cerning whether a contributing entity was a member of a controlled
group.
Presumably in recognition of this and similar information gaps,
Section 4219(a) of ERISA provides:
An employer shall, within 30 days after a written request from the plan sponsor,
furnish such information as the plan sponsor reasonably determines to be necessary
to enable the plan sponsor to comply with the requirements of this part.1' 2
Plans routinely rely on Section 4219(a) to gather controlled group
information, and, given its mandatory language, the courts should
have little difficulty in concluding that this Section creates an en-
forceable obligation. 103 For example, in the Superior Forwarding'04 case,
the plan asked Superior, which was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, to
complete a "Statement of Business Affairs" indicating whether it was
a member of a controlled group. The bankruptcy court ordered Su-
perior to comply, and the district court affirmed, noting that to de-
termine whether there had been a withdrawal the plan had to "consider
the employer as a whole." 05
Courts have also enforced Section 4219(a) after withdrawal liability
has been assessed, in order to enable plans to preserve the ability to
99. See infra section II.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1145.
101. Rubinstein v. Tri-State Transp. Inc., 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2372 (1984).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(a).
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1) ("a plan fiduciary ... who is adversely affected by the act or
omission of any party under this subtitle .... may bring an action for appropriate legal or equitable
relief . . .") Id.
104. Superior Forwarding Co. v. Central States Pension Fund, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
2694 (1985).
105. Id. at 2695.
19
Goldowitz and Gigot: The Controlled Group Rule for Purposes of the Withdrawl Liability
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
collect. In the Miss-Ala case, 1'1 for example, the plan sought an order
compelling Miss-Ala to make interim payments pending arbitration
and to compel it to furnish financial statements and controlled group
information to enable the plan to "preserve and collect the claims."107
The court held that such information was reasonably necessary to
protect the plan and ordered that it be furnished. 08 This suggests that
because Section 4219(a) gives a plan a substantive right to obtain
information of this kind, the ordinary rule against pre-judgment asset
discovery' °9 should not apply in withdrawal liability cases, particularly
to discovery of the identities of parties who may have joint and several
liability.
B. Notice of Withdrawal Liability
As noted above, deadlines for payment, plan sponsor review, and
arbitration are triggered by the issuance of a notice and demand to
the employer." 0 In the preamble to a regulation governing "Notice
and Collection of Withdrawal Liability,""' the PBGC stated:
[Uinder ERISA there is a unity of interest in the case of a controlled group of
corporations, since the entire group is considered to be a single employer for with-
drawal liability and other purposes. Therefore, PBGC believes that a notice of default
sent to the contributing entity which is a member of a controlled group of cor-
porations, within the meaning of Section 4001(b)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1)], con-
stitutes constructive notice to the other members of the same controlled group. Thus,
PBGC finds that Section 4219(c)(5)(A) [29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5)(A)] does not require
notice to the other members of a controlled group.
1" 2
This discussion on its face pertains only to the notice required to
accelerate the principal amount of an employer's withdrawal liability
in the event of default on installment payments. Nevertheless, the
courts have applied this rule to the initial notice and demand for
106. Combs v. Miss-Ala Elec. Contractors, Inc., 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2830 (1985).
107. Id. at 2831.
108. Id. at 2831-32.
109. 8 C. Wmiorr & A. Muisa, FEDERAL PRAcncE AND PRocsEtDu § 2010 n.78 (1970).
110. See infra section III.
II1. 49 Fed. Reg. 22,642 (1984).
112. 49 Fed. Reg. 22,644 (1984).
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installment payments. As one court put it, "notice and demand to
one is notice and demand to all. 113
The Third Circuit articulated a policy rationale for this rule in the
Barker & Williamson'14 case. According to the Third Circuit, ERISA's
notice provisions should be liberally construed in favor of plans to
effectuate Congress' goal of protecting employees." 5 Moreover, "a
fund can only be expected to provide notice to the corporation that
is the ostensible employer;" it has "no way of knowing the ownership
of a closely held corporation. ' 1 6 The stockholders and officers, by
contrast, are aware of their holdings. If, upon receiving a withdrawal
liability notice and demand, they choose to ignore the potential for
controlled group liability, then a subsequent finding that there is a
control group and that it has forfeited its defenses, by failing to initiate
plan sponsor review and arbitration, is "but a self-inflicted wound.""1
7
C. Arbitrability of Controlled Group Questions
ERISA's arbitration command is broad. Section 4221(a) provides
that "[a]ny dispute ... concerning a determination made under Sec-
tions 4201 through 4219 shall be resolved through arbitration." '
Common control, however, is governed by Section 4001(b)(1) of ER-
ISA, outside the range of Sections 4201 through 4219. Moreover, un-
less a business is under common control with the withdrawing business,
it is arguably not part of the "employer" to which Section 4221(a)'s
arbitration command applies.1 19 Nevertheless, employers and plans have
113. Calvert Dev. Co., 622 F. Supp. at 881. Accord Local 807 Labor-Management Pension Fund
v. ABC Fast Forwarding Freight Corp., No. 82-C-3356 slip op. at 8-9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar, 7, 1984); Ryan's
Coal Co., slip op. at 2-3.
114. Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d 118.
115. Id. at 127.
116. Id. at 128.
117. Id. at 129.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a).
119. Some courts would probably characterize "employer" or controlled group status as a juris-
dictional prerequisite to arbitration. See I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Stockton Tri Indus. 727 F.2d 1204
(D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Refined Sugars, Inc. v. Local 807 Labor-Management Pension Fund, 632 F.
Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The seminal Supreme Court case on the subject of prerequisites to agency
jurisdiction makes clear, however, that a dispute as to a "jurisdictional" fact does not necessarily strip
the agency of jurisdiction to consider that dispute in the first instance. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932). Recent withdrawal liability cases are in accord with this principle. Cf. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v.
21
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not hesitated to submit common control questions to arbitration, and
arbitrators have not hesitated to resolve those common control ques-
tions. 12° This is because substantive questions which are "quintessen-
tially" arbitrable, such as whether and when a withdrawal occurred,'21
are often bound up with the common control question. In the Western
Dominion Coal22 case, for example, the employer argued before the
arbitrator that it was under common control with a business that
continued to perform covered operations under the plans and, there-
fore, that no withdrawal had occurred.12 Similarly, in the Manor Mines
case, 1' 4 one business that ceased covered operations before MPPAA's
effective date maintained before the arbitrator that it should not be
treated as under common control with a sister corporation that con-
tinued to perform operations beyond MPPAA's effective date, and
that because of its pre-effective date of withdrawal it incurred no lia-
bility.1'2
Given the consequences of missing the arbitration deadline,'26 the
putative controlled group member has every incentive to submit the
controlled group question to arbitration. The Barker & Williamson
27
case illustrates this point. Barker & Williamson ("B&W"), the entity
that participated in the plan and that received the plan's notice and
demand for withdrawal liability, failed to pursue plan sponsor review
and arbitration of the plan's claim.12s Evidently, B&W thought itself
judgment-proof. The court held that this failure to pursue mandatory
review and arbitration foreclosed the "employer" from disputing the
Central States Pension Fund, 659 F. Supp. 13, (D. Del. 1986), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1241 (3d Cir. 1987) (whether
group of corporations is part of withdrawn "employer" based on a transaction proscribed by ERISA §
4212(c) must be decided by arbitration); accord Banner Indus. Inc. v. Central States Pension Fund, 657
F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1986), cert. granted, 663 F. Supp. 1290 (N.D. Il. 1987); Tri-State Rubber v.
Central States Pension Fund, 661 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
120. E.g., Western Dominion, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2353; Manor Mines, 5 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1708; UMWA 1974 Pension Plan v. Three States Energy Corp., AAA No. 16 621
0005 84T (February 20, 1985) (Clarke, Arb.), enforcement denied, No. 85-0941 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 1985).
121. Connors v. BMC Coal Co., 634 F. Supp. 74 (D.D.C. 1986).
122. Western Dominion, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2353.
123. Id. at 2360-61.
124. Manor Mines, 5 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1708.
125. Id. at 1709.
126. E.g., Clinton Engines Corp., 825 F.2d 415.
127. Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d 118.
128. Id. at 121.
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fact or amount of its liability under well-settled law. 29 Thus, the only
fact necessary for the plan to prove to establish the liability of the
putative controlled group member, Sentinel Electronics, was an 80o
common ownership interest.13 0
The business in Sentinel's position may believe it is caught on the
horns of a dilemma. It must request review and initiate arbitration
of the plan's withdrawal liability claim to preserve its defenses, but
arguably it can pursue plan-sponsor review and arbitration only if it
is under common control with, i.e., part of the same "employer" as
the withdrawn business.
In this respect, Barker & Williamson is probably atypical. In most
cases, the controlled group components should have no doubt as to
their controlled group status.'3' Sentinel's inclusion in the B&W control
group hinged on whether an oral option agreement existed, an unusual
fact pattern. 3 2 In those few cases, like Barker & Williamson, where
common control is open to genuine dispute, nothing prevents the pu-
tative controlled group member from challenging common control in
the review and arbitration stage. 33
We believe that such issues should be submitted to arbitration.
Arbitration will probably be quicker and less expensive than district
court litigation. Moreover, fact issues underlying a control group dis-
pute, such as whether an option existed, should be grist for the ar-
bitrator's mill. 34 Additionally, though the employer may contend that
common control is a question of law that should be decided by the
courts, the PBGC's arbitration regulations and a growing body of
129. Id. at 122.
130. Id.; accord Ryan's Coal Co., slip op. at 1.
131. A controlled group of corporations will frequently file a consolidated income tax return to take
advantage of favorable tax treatment. See 26 U.S.C. § 1504 (1974). In addition, as the Supreme Court
observed in Vogel, the controlling interest test ensures that the controlled group's shareholders will not
be "caught by surprise." Vogel, 455 U.S. at 34-35.
132. But see Central Trans. Inc., 640 F. Supp. at 56.
133. Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d at 118. The Third Circuit's assumption that the putative con-
trolled group member would have to concede common control to pursue arbitration is curious. The
flexibility of ERISA's arbitration procedures should permit the employer and plan in the atypical case
like Barker & Williamson to bifurcate their dispute, putting forward first only the controlled group issue.
134. Republic Indus. Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council, 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
567 U.S. 1259 (1984).
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case law make it clear that MPPAA arbitrators are empowered to
resolve any such "legal" questions, or mixed questions of law and
fact, in the first instance. 35
Even in cases where the existence and timing of common control
are not in dispute, arbitration may be in order for another reason.
In a number of cases, plans have asserted that an ownership change
that altered the controlled group configuration was designed to evade
or avoid the plan's collection of withdrawal liability. 36 Section 4212(c)
of ERISA provides that transactions intended to evade or avoid with-
drawal liability shall be disregarded. 37 In the plan's view, a Section
4212(c) issue is not only literally within ERISA's mandatory arbitra-
tion range (a "dispute . .. under Sections 4201 through 4219"), but
it also involves the sort of fact-centered questions that demand ar-
bitration.13 8
In the Flying Tiger case, for example, the parent set of organi-
zations (collectively "Tiger") sold its controlling interest in a business
that performed covered operations under several plans to a holding
company that was established by the parent, but was not commonly-
controlled.139 The business that participated in the plans ceased covered
operations only after the stock sale' 40 so Tiger viewed itself as in-
sulated from the withdrawal liability claims incurred by its former
subsidiary. The plans contended otherwise, apparently based on the
fact that the "new" parent, like the subsidiary, had insufficient assets
to pay withdrawal liability.14' Although the district court initially agreed
with Tiger that the only issue was a simple "legal" issue of controlled
135. See Robbins v. Chipman Trucking, Inc., 8 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 125 (1986) and cases
cited therein.
136. Flying Tiger Lines, 659 F. Supp. at 13; Banner Indus. 657 F. Supp. 875; DeBreceni v. Graf
Bros., No. 85-3386-MA (D.Mass. May 19, 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d at 877 (Ist Cir. 1987).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c).
138. Republic Indus. 718 F.2d at 628; Connors v. Pelbro Fuel, Inc., No. 83-1524, slip op. at 14
(D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1984) ("... . it is difficult for the court to envision any question of statutory inter-
pretation without having to make some inquiry into relevant facts of the case"); Williamson Shaft Con-
tracting Co. v. UMWA 1974 Pension Plan, 585 F. Supp. 633 (W.D.Pa. 1984) ("It is hard for [the court]
to envision what is solely a matter of statutory interpretation without reference to facts. Philosophers
may be able to do this, but not this court"). Id. at 634.





West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/5
19881 CONTROLLED GROUP LIABILITY - A UNION VIEW
group timing, justiciable in the first instance, it ultimately reversed
itself, agreeing that the plans had stated arbitrable claims against Tiger
under ERISA § 4212(c).142 In this regard, Flying Tiger and its progeny1 43
suggest that so long as a trade or business was under common control
with the withdrawn employer at one time, not necessarily on the date
of withdrawal, it may be part of the "employer" to which ERISA's
arbitration requirement applies. 144 Beyond this, little decisional law has
developed as to what facts are necessary to establish that an ownership
change is a transaction intended to evade or avoid withdrawal lia-
bility. 145
D. Controlled Group Rule May Establish Privity for Res Judicata
Purposes
A final judgment on the merits bars relitigation of the same claim
between the parties or those in privity with them.14 Where a plan has
obtained a judgment for withdrawal liability and learns of the exis-
tence of controlled group members only in post-judgment discovery,
it may seek to bar them from relitigating the merits of the underlying
claim on the grounds that they were in privity with the named de-
fendant.
The Danin47 case, which involved delinquent employer contribu-
tions, furnishes an instructive analogy. There, the plan obtained a
judgment against Mohawk Manufacturing, and when it learned that
Mohawk was without assets, it sued Mohawk's shareholders and a
related company, Vi-Mil, on theories of piercing the corporate veil.'"
The court held that these parties were in privity with Mohawk because
they had controlled Mohawk's defense and had a proprietary interest
142. Id. at 15.
143. Id. at 13; Banner Indus., 657 F. Supp. at 875; Tn-State Rubber, 661 F. Supp. at 46.
144. Flying Tiger, 659 F. Supp. at 13; Banner Indus., 657 F. Supp. at 875; Ti State Rubber, 661
F. Supp. at 46.
145. But see Dorns Transp., Inc. v. Teamsters Pension Trust, 787 F.2d at 902 (suggesting that "good
faith" indicates no evasion or avoidance); see also Cuyamaca Meats, Inc. v. Butchers' and Food Em-
ployees' Pension Fund, 827 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1987).
146. See generally 1B J. MooPE, J. LucAs, T. Cunci, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.42211]
(2d ed. 1985).
147. Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d at 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
148. Id. 25
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in the outcome, 149 citing the Supreme Court's decision in Montana v.
United States.50 Significantly, it appears that, rather than specifically
finding control in fact, the court inferred control from the share-
holders' awareness of the "questionable nature of Mohawk's cor-
porate identity," which gave them an obvious stake in the outcome."'
Because there is a "unity of interest" among controlled group
members,52 one member clearly would have a stake in the outcome
of a withdrawal liability arbitration or suit involving another member.
Further, a member should be aware that, despite observance of cor-
porate formalities and the absence of fraud, the controlled group rule
functions as a mandatory piercing of the corporate veil.'53 Therefore,
as in the Danin case, a court may conclude, as matter of law, that
controlled group members who are not named parties have a sufficient
interest in the outcome and control of the defense of a withdrawal
liability proceeding that they should be bound by the arbitration award
or judgment. 154 In this regard, the Ninth Circuit recently held that
there is no due process violation where a later-discovered controlled
group member is held liable on a judgment for withdrawal liability. 55
E. Personal Liability Where Controlled Group Member is
Unincorporated
Section 3(5) of ERISA provides that an "employer" includes "any
person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of
an employer .... 156 This language is identical to that of Section 3(d)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which has been construed to impose
149. Id. at 3.
150. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
151. See Danin, 801 F.2d at 3.
152. 49 Fed. Reg. 22,644.
153. Ouimet 11, 711 F.2d at 1093 (1983).
154. A court may also conclude that such controlled group members are bound because they could
have intervened. See Penn Central Merger and N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968). As the
Third Circuit has noted, a putative controlled group member would probably have standing to initiate
arbitration or to sue for a declaration as to its controlled group status, Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d
at 129, and by the same token it probably would have standing to intervene in an arbitration initiated
by an affiliate or a collection suit brought against an affiliate. See Manor Mines, 5 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1708.
155. H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 1015. Privity was apparently not in issue.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (1982).
[Vol. 90
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personal liability for unpaid wages on controlling shareholders.1 7 Sec-
tion 3(5), however, has been held not to impose personal liability for
withdrawal on the owners of a closely-held corporation in the absence
of facts supporting piercing of the corporate veil.'- 8
Nevertheless, if a controlled group member is a proprietorship,
partnership, or other unincorporated business, it should be obvious
that its owner or owners will be personally liable for withdrawal li-
ability incurred by the unincorporated business as a controlled group
member. In the Johnson case, 59 though the court characterized this
as a question of first impression, it had no difficulty in reaching this
conclusion under general partnership law.'(t'
There is no statutory exception to this rule.' 6' There is however,
a limitation on the personal assets that are subject to execution on
a judgment for withdrawal liability. Section 4225(c) of ERISA exempts
from execution any property that would be exempt from a debtor's
estate under Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code "[t]o the extent that
the withdrawal liability of an employer is attributable to his obligation
to contribute to or under a plan as an individual (whether as a sole
proprietor or as a member of a partnership).... "162 In Johnson, the
Ninth Circuit held that this limitation applied whether the unincor-
porated business was the business obligated to contribute under a col-
lective bargaining agreement or was merely under common control
with such a business. 63 The court reasoned that under the controlled
group rule, all commonly controlled trades or businesses are jointly
157. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982). See Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1983).
158. Connors v. P&M Coal Co., 801 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1986); DeBreceni v. Graf Brothers
Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d at 877. Courts are divided over whether a liberal federal piercing standard or
state standards should be applied in ERISA cases. Compare Laborers Clean-Up Contract Admin. Trust
Fund v. Uriarte Clean-Up Service, Inc., 736 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1984), and Solomon v. Klein, 770 F.2d
352 (3d Cir. 1985). It should be noted that Congress intended that the courts develop "a body of federal
substantive law" under ERISA. 120 CONG. Rac. 29942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits).
159. H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 1009.
160. Id. at 1014-16.
161. Where Congress has enacted a detailed statute, courts should not carve out equitable exceptions
not found in the language of the statute. Central States Pension Fund v. Bellmont Trucking Co., Inc.,
788 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1986).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 1405(c), 1391(d)(2). It should be noted that the relief provisions of Section 4225
do not apply to the UMWA 1950 and 1974 Plans, absent a plan amendment. See Combs, slip op. at
3.
163. H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 1015.
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obligated to contribute, so that the owner of an unincorporated con-
trolled group member would always have an obligation "to contribute
... as an individual" as meant by Section 4225(c).164
We respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit on this point. Sec-
tion 4001 of ERISA, by its terms, applies only "[flor purposes of
this title," 165 i.e., Title IV of ERISA. An employer's obligation to
contribute, however, is governed by Section 515 of ERISA, which is
contained in Title I.'6 Although Section 3(5) does define an "em-
ployer," for Title I purposes, to include any person acting "in the
interest of an employer," Title I does not define an "employer" to
include a controlled group. 67 Therefore, absent a piercing of the cor-
porate veil, it has been held that controlled group members are not
liable for contributions if they are not parties to the collective bar-
gaining agreement.16
In this regard, it is true that "in enacting a later chapter without
express definitions," Congress is "free to rely on those already con-
tained in the relevant title," despite a pro forma limitation of those
definitions to the chapter in which they appear. 69 Though Section 515
was added to Title I in 1980 as part of MPPAA and Title IV's con-
trolled group rule had been extant since 1974, Section 515 was not
a "later" chapter, but an addition to an earlier chapter, which did
not contain the controlled group rule. Moreover, Title I contains its
own express definition of "employer.' 170 Therefore, it seems highly
unlikely that Congress would have intended for a Title IV definition
to color the meaning of a new Title I obligation, when it took care
164. Id.
165. 29 U.S.C. § 1301.
166. That provision states that:
[e]very employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the
terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent
not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions
of such plan or such agreement.
29 U.S.C. § 1145.
167. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5).
168. Rubinstein, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2372.
169. T.I.M.E.-D.C. v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 580 F.
Supp. 621, 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). aff'd, 735 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1984). Accord Nachman Corp. v. PBGC,
592 F.2d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 1979), affd, 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5).
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to set forth different definitions of "employer" for Title I and Title
IV purposes in 1974.
F. Preemption: State Law Limitation on Liability
Section 514(a) of ERISA states that the provisions of Titles I and
IV of ERISA shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... -171
This provision expresses an extremely broad preemption principle, as
illustrated by the leading case of Delta Airlines.7 2 There, the Supreme
Court considered a state statute requiring pregnancy disability benefits
in excess of those required by federal civil rights law, insofar as it
required provision of such benefits by an ERISA-covered welfare
plan. 7 3 The Court noted that, unlike the situation with pension plans,
ERISA does not regulate the nature of benefits provided under welfare
plans. 174 It held nevertheless that a state law "relate[s] to" an ERISA
plan if it has a "connection with or reference to" such a plan, and
that the statute in question "relate[d] to" the plan to the extent it
required the plan to pay specific benefits.
75
Arguably, state laws governing debtor-creditor relations should not
be considered preempted insofar as they affect a plan's claim against
an employer, because they do not relate to the core concern of ERISA,
the provision of benefits to employees. Some pre- and even post-Delta
Airlines cases have taken that view.176 Some courts have even held
that state laws specifically designed to supplement the collection rem-
edies available to a plan under ERISA are not preempted.1
77
Two recent Court of Appeals decisions, however, are to the con-
trary. In the McMahon 78 case, the Third Circuit held that the Penn-
171. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
172. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 91.
175. Id. at 91, 95-97.
176. Deiches v. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund, 4 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2195 (1983)
(state preferential transfer law); see also Gould, Inc. v. PBGC, 5 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1725
(1984) (state suretyship law).
177. E.g., Sasso v. Vachris, 66 N.Y.2d 28, 484 N.E.2d 1359, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1985) (state statute
providing for shareholder liability for unpaid plan contributions).
178. McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 473 (1986).
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sylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law ("WPCL"), which imposes
personal liability on corporate officers and directors for unpaid wages
and fringe benefits, was preempted insofar as it imposed liability for
unpaid contributions to a ERISA plan. 179 The court held that the fact
that WPCL merely "supplement[s]" ERISA did not save it, because
it "competes with the mechanism that Congress carefully established
in ERISA itself."' 180
In the Johnson case, 181 the Ninth Circuit was faced with perhaps
the most difficult preemption question to date. Not only was the state
statute one of general applicability to creditors, but it was in an area
the court acknowledged was of "special concern to the states," the
administration of decedents' estates. 82 There, the plan obtained a
judgment for withdrawal liability against a corporation, and subse-
quently discovered that there was a commonly-controlled partner-
ship.'8 By that time, however, one of the partners had died and
Montana's 4-month period for bringing claims against his estate had
run. 84 Nevertheless, the court held that ERISA's six-year statute of
limitations for withdrawal liability claims' 85 preempted the Montana
statute. The court concluded that, in the words of the Delta Airlines
case, the Montana statute had "a connection with or reference" to
the plan and therefore "relate[d] to" the plan, because its effect was
to bar the plan's claim.18 6 Moreover, it noted, the general rule is that
a state statute of limitations applies to a federal claim only in the
absence of a federal statute of limitations or, if none, in the absence
of conflict with federal policy.'17
Under the rationale of the Johnson decision, state statutes pro-
viding that corporations can be sued only within a limited period after
179. McMahon, 794 F.2d at 108.
180. Id. at 106. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (plan entitled to interest, liquidated damages, and at-
torney's fees when it prevails in suit for delinquent contributions).
181. H. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 1009.
182. Id. at 1016.
183. Id. at 1012.
184. Id. at 1016.
185. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f)(1).
186. H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 1016.
187. Id. at 1016-17.
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dissolution, typically two years,188 would also presumably be pre-
empted with respect to a withdrawal liability claim. Though one could
argue that such a statute actually deals with capacity to sue or be
sued, not limitation of actions, it would nevertheless be inconsistent
in its effect with an explicit federal statute of limitations, as well as
federal policy of allowing plans a relatively long period - six years
- in which to prosecute withdrawal liability claims against the com-
mon-law employer as well as its controlled group members.
VI. CONCLUSION
The controlled group rule affects all substantive and procedural
aspects of the withdrawal liability provisions of ERISA. Therefore,
an understanding of the rule is critical to an understanding of the
withdrawal liability provisions themselves. The rule has been construed
liberally to maximize the plans' ability to collect withdrawal liability,
and properly so, given Congress' intent of assuring the solvency of
multiemployer plans, so that employees will receive promised benefits
when they retire.
188. See 16A W. Ft.rcmm, supra note 90, § 41.
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